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They Won’t Come Knocking No More
HUDSON V. MICHIGAN AND THE DEMISE
OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
The requirement is no mere procedural nicety or formality attendant
upon the service of a warrant. Decisions in both federal and state
courts have recognized, as did English courts, that the requirement
is of the essence of substantive protections which safeguard
individual liberty.
Ker v. California1

I.

INTRODUCTION

A tenet central to the Founders’ conception of the
Fourth Amendment was the protection of the right to privacy
in one’s home.2 Throughout its history the Supreme Court has
recognized this purpose by imposing limitations on the ability
of law enforcement officials to enter one’s home.3 One such
limitation is the knock-and-announce rule. This rule requires
police officers to knock and announce their presence and then
wait a reasonable amount of time before making a forcible
entry when executing a search.4 A common law principle
established well before the Bill of Rights, this rule was incorporated into the reasonableness analysis of Fourth Amendment
search-and-seizure law in order to safeguard individuals’ rights
against unannounced police entry into their homes.5

1
2

374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 51-52. The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3
E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294 (1987); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
4
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
5
See id. at 934 infra Part II.A.

1209

1210

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

Typically, when the government and police fail to uphold
Fourth Amendment protections, the evidence gathered during
the unlawful search must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.6 In Hudson v. Michigan, however, the Supreme Court
announced in a 5-4 decision that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to evidence obtained when police officers fail to knock
and announce, and accordingly, the evidence seized can be used
at trial to determine a defendant’s guilt.7
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson appears to be
another step in the weakening of the knock-and-announce rule.
In 1995, Wilson v. Arkansas made the rule a constitutional
command.8 Since Wilson, however, the Court has carved out
exceptions that have significantly watered down the rule’s
impact.9 By not applying the exclusionary rule to knock-andannounce violations, the Hudson majority effectively took away
any legal incentive for police officers to conform their actions to
what the Court held was constitutionally required in Wilson.10
The Court’s decision not to apply the exclusionary rule was
largely based on the substantial social costs generated by
expanding its use.11 In reaching its conclusion, the majority
reasoned that the increased professionalism of today’s police
officers effectively deters law enforcement officials from
violating the knock-and-announce rule.12
This Note contests the Court’s conclusion in Hudson
that the increased professionalism of the police force effectively
deters an officer’s unlawful behavior. First, it is doubtful that
such a trend toward increased professionalism actually exists.
On the contrary, the growing involvement of paramilitary
units in local police activities have made militaristic police
tactics increasingly commonplace.13 Second, when this trend is
6

See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
8
514 U.S. at 936.
9
See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 40 (2003); Richards v. Wisconsin,
520 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1997).
10
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 605 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how police
incentive to comply with knock-and-announce violations has significantly diminished
as a result of the majority’s holding); see also RADLEY BALKO, CATO INSTITUTE,
OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA 34 (2006),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/balko_whitepaper_2006.pdf.
11
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594-99; see infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
12
Id. at 598-99.
13
See Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing Mayberry and
Beyond: Making Sense of American Paramilitary Policing, 14 JUST. Q. 607, 618, 622-24
(1997); DIANE CECILIA WEBER, WARRIOR COPS: THE OMINOUS GROWTH OF
PARAMILITARISM IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 11 (1999), http://www.cato.org/
7
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considered alongside the fact that Hudson provides officers
with little incentive to comply with the knock-and-announce
guidelines, it is likely that combative police behavior and an
increase in wrong-door raids will result.14 This Note contends
that in order to uphold the protections of the knock-andannounce requirement and ensure police discipline, the exclusionary rule must be applied. In support of this argument, this
Note looks to the experience of the Miranda rule in order to
demonstrate the problems that can result when the Court
weakens an established requirement to the point that there is
no longer any real incentive to comply with its procedures.15
Part II of this Note briefly surveys the history of the
knock-and-announce rule as it has evolved from its common
law origins and highlights the exclusionary rule as it applies
to knock-and-announce violations. Part III summarizes the
Court’s decision in Hudson v. Michigan, primarily focusing on
the majority’s argument that the exclusionary rule should not
apply to evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce
requirement because the substantial social costs generated by
the rule’s application outweighs the deterrence benefits on
police misconduct. Part IV discusses the Court’s cost-benefit
analysis and suggests that the mechanisms the Court puts
forth insufficiently deter police misconduct and instead foster
aggressive police tactics and detrimental behavior. Part V
compares how police training has responded to the Court’s
Miranda jurisprudence and contends that unless the
exclusionary rule is applied to knock-and-announce violations,
police officials may encourage officers to bypass knock-and-

pubs/briefs/bp50.pdf. The term “paramilitary units” is used to describe the militarization of local police forces. Over the last two decades the number of SWAT teams and
similar units have proliferated within local police departments, and have been used to
carry out routine police functions. This Note will focus on the “no-knock raids” typically
employed by these units, and suggest that this harmful tactic will increase due to the
Court’s decision in Hudson. A “no-knock raid” is an unannounced and forced entry into
an individual’s home when executing a search warrant. BALKO, supra note 10, at 3-5.
14
See BALKO, supra note 10, at 34.
15
See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109
(1998) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Saving Miranda] (arguing that the original vision of
Miranda has been transformed, and as a result police departments have begun to
promote a policy of questioning “outside Miranda”). The policy of training officers to
question outside Miranda became apparent in the late 1990s as officers in California
were being taught that as a result of Supreme Court decisions, “it is perfectly
acceptable to violate Miranda because Miranda . . . has no application except to bar
certain statements from the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Proponents of this new vision
tell police that they need not cease interrogating a suspect who has asserted his or her
Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. at 132.
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announce guidelines in much the same way they have
encouraged officers to question suspects “outside Miranda.”
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Knock-and-Announce Rule

Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers must
knock and announce their presence when executing a search
warrant at an individual’s home.16 This knock-and-announce
rule provides residents an opportunity to willingly open their
door before police officers forcibly enter.17 The rule is designed
to protect people’s privacy interests in their home against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is a right central to
the Fourth Amendment.18 In particular, the Supreme Court has
set forth three main purposes of the rule: “1) reducing the
potential for violence to both the police officers and the
occupants of the home into which entry is sought; 2) curbing
the needless destruction of property; and 3) protecting the
individual’s right to privacy in his or her house.”19
The knock-and-announce rule is a common law principle
that dates to thirteenth-century England.20 In 1604, English
courts formally established the knock-and-announce requirement in Semayne’s Case.21 Based on the principle that “a man’s
house is his castle,” the court recognized the privacy interest an
individual has in his or her home and determined that before
forcibly entering one’s home, officers should announce their
presence and allow the occupant time to open his or her door.22
16

United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003).
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
18
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Wilson. 514 U.S. at 934.
19
United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule should be suppressed at
trial, regardless of its use to help fight the War on Drugs).
20
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (holding that under 18
U.S.C § 3109 the police officers violated the rights of the defendant when they knocked
and said “police” in a low voice, but did not announce their purpose and their reason for
arresting him). Records show that in the 13th Yearbook of Edward IV, it was illegal for
a sheriff to forcibly enter a man’s home and arrest him for a suit which involved either
debt or trespass. See id.
21
Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
22
See Miller, 357 U.S. at 307-08 (1958); see also Sabbath v. United States,
391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968). Based on the principle, “a man’s house is his castle,” the
English court believed that, “the house of every one is to him his castle and fortress, as
well for his defense against injury and violence, as for his repose.” Martin Estrada, A
Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: “The Knock-and-Announce Rule” and The
Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 80 (2005) (quoting 77 Eng. Rep.
17
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This common law principle, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109,
became part of American statutory law when Congress passed
the Espionage Act in 1917.23
In 1995, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Wilson
v. Arkansas that the knock-and-announce rule should be
considered in the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis
of a search or seizure.24 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
surveyed the common law’s knock-and-announce requirement
and determined that the Framers of the Constitution intended
the method used to enter an individual’s residence should be a
factor when evaluating the reasonableness of a search or
seizure.25 This decision transformed the knock-and-announce
rule from a common law or statutory mandate into a constitutional command.26
Additionally, the Wilson Court recognized that the
knock-and-announce requirement is not an inflexible or rigid
rule. The Court suggested that there are certain circumstances
in which an unannounced entry would be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.27 Specifically, the Court determined that
the “knock-and-announce requirement could give way ‘under
circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence’ or
‘where police officers have reason to believe that the evidence
194, 195 (K.B. 1603)). Moreover, in recognizing the sacredness of the home, in an
English Parliamentary debate, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, made a powerful
statement regarding one’s right to privacy in their home:
[T]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain many enter; but the King of England cannot enterall his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Miller, 357 U.S. at 307.
23
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589 (2006); see Miller, 357 U.S. at 308.
Section 3109 of the U.S. Code governs the breaking of doors or windows for entry or
exit, stating in relevant part:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when
necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the
warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000).
24
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
25
Id. at 934.
26
See id. at 936.
27
Id. at 934-36. As the Wilson Court stated, “[W]e simply hold that although
a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers
enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry.” Id. at 936.

1214

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

would likely be destroyed if advance notice was given.’”28
In Wilson, however, the Court refrained from making any
bright line rule and asserted that the lower courts would be
responsible for assessing when an unannounced entry is
reasonable.29
Two years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court carved out exceptions to the requirement that a police
officer must knock and announce.30 In Richards, the Court
invalidated Wisconsin’s per se rule that a no-knock entry is
always justifiable in felony drug cases, yet concluded that
certain circumstances warrant a no-knock entry.31 The Court
established that where police have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking-and-announcing would be “dangerous or futile” or
would “inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing destruction of the evidence,” then a no-knock
entry under the circumstances is lawful.32 Accordingly, this
reasonableness inquiry is to be done on a case-by-case basis,
balancing the concerns of law enforcement officials with an
individual’s right to privacy in his or her home.33
Six years later the Court attempted to clarify some of
the ambiguities resulting from Wilson and Richards.34 In
United States v. Banks, the Court determined that in a case
where police have knocked-and-announced their presence and
have a reasonable belief that destruction of the evidence is
possible, fifteen to twenty seconds is a reasonable amount of
time to wait before forcibly entering an individual’s home.35
Recognizing that the purpose of the knock-and-announce rule
28

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391 (1997) (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S.

at 936).
29

Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
Richards, 520 U.S. 385 (holding that a police officer’s failure to knock and
announce would be justifiable if the officer had reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing would be dangerous or futile or would prohibit an effective investigation).
31
Id. at 394. E.g., United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 983 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that circumstances in which the knock-and-announce rule is not required
include (1) the occupant knows that the police are present and their purpose for being
there; (2) the police have a justifiable belief that an individual may be in imminent
danger; and (3) the officers have a justifiable belief that the residents in the home are
aware of police presence and as a result are trying to escape or discard the evidence).
32
Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. As the Supreme Court recognized, the showing
of reasonable suspicion “is not high,” but if challenged, the police must be able to justify
their no-knock entry. Id. at 394-95.
33
Id.
34
See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003).
35
Id. at 40. In forming its conclusion, the Court reasoned that “15 to 20
seconds does not seem an unrealistic guess about the time someone would need to get
in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine.” Id.
30
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is to allow a resident to willingly open his or her door, the
Court again refrained from making a blanket categorical rule
as to the appropriate manner and timing of a police officer’s
entry.36 Rather, the Court stated that the reasonableness of an
officer’s entry should depend on the totality of the circumstances in a given case.37
The knock-and-announce rule is embedded in our
nation’s history. In recognizing its importance in protecting an
individual’s right to privacy, the Supreme Court made it a
constitutional command and part of the reasonableness inquiry
of the Fourth Amendment.38 In Richardson and Banks, the
Court began to carve out exceptions to this requirement.
Hudson represents the Court’s latest, and most troubling,
dilution of a once tenacious constitutional rule.39
B.

The Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy
that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.40 Any physical or tangible goods,
as well as verbal statements, that are gathered pursuant to an
unreasonable search or seizure may not be used to prove a
defendant’s guilt at trial.41 However, there are exceptions to the
exclusionary rule that allow parties to introduce the illegally
36
Id. at 41. The Court reasoned that, “in a case with no reason to suspect an
immediate risk of frustration or futility in waiting at all, the reasonable wait time may
well be longer . . . since [police] ought to be more certain the occupant has had time to
answer the door.” Id.
37
Id. at 42.
38
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995).
39
See infra Part V.
40
Weeks v. Unites States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (holding that it was a
violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when the government illegally
seized letters and papers from defendant which were later used as evidence against
him at trial). The Court felt that the letters should have been returned to the
defendant and that their use constituted a prejudicial error. Id. at 398.
41
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963) (holding that
verbal evidence that was obtained during an unlawful entry and arrest is considered
“fruits of the agents unlawful action” and therefore must be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule). The Court has determined:

The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct
result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and
found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” It
“extends as well to the indirect as the direct products” of unconstitutional
conduct.
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), and Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484).
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obtained evidence at trial. The Supreme Court has concluded
that the use of evidence seized under these exceptions does not
violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.42
The exclusionary rule was first applied to federal
prosecutions in Weeks v. United States.43 In Weeks, the Supreme
Court determined that evidence obtained without a warrant is
a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights and therefore
shall not be admitted at trial.44 The Court reasoned that to hold
otherwise would render the Fourth Amendment ineffective, as
it would have “no value . . . [and] might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.”45
Subsequently, the Supreme Court expanded the use of
the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio and held it applicable to
state courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 The majority’s opinion in Mapp appears to be
supported by two justifications, both of which guided the
Court’s application of the exclusionary rule in federal trials.47
First, the Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule would
deter police misconduct, and second, the Court believed that
the rule’s application would uphold judicial integrity.48 As the
Mapp majority emphasized, “the purpose of the exclusionary
rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional
42
See The Exclusionary Rule, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 186, 186201 (2006) (discussing the exceptions to the exclusionary rule). For the purposes of this
Note, the exceptions to the exclusionary rule do not need to be discussed in detail.
However, it is worth noting that several exceptions to the exclusionary rule do exist.
These include: the good faith exception established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984); the attenuation exception, see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471; the independent
source exception, see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
the inevitable discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); and other
collateral uses, see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (where the court made an
exception in a habeas corpus proceeding). For more information and cases in which
these exceptions can be found, see The Exclusionary Rule, supra.
43
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 393.
46
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained
based on the police’s illegal warrantless entry can not be admissible in state courts).
Mapp signified the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, where twelve years prior the
Supreme Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to states. Id. at 654-55; see also
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1949) (holding that Due Process of the law does
not automatically mean that the first eight Amendments of the Constitution are
incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment; here the Court did not believe that the
federal exclusionary rule should be applied to the states).
47
See Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, 657-59; see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 484-85.
48
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658-59; see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 484-85.
Additionally, these two principles appeared to first be laid out pre-Mapp, in Elkins v.
United States, when the Court applied the exclusionary rule in federal trials. Id. at
484.
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guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing
the incentive to disregard it.’”49 Moreover, the Court noted the
importance of preserving judicial integrity, asserting that
“nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws . . . . ‘If the government becomes
a law breaker it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.’”50
Accordingly, these guiding principles supported the Court’s
reasoning that when evidence is obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, it should be suppressed at both the federal
and state level.51
In the 1974 case United States v. Calandra, the
Supreme Court clarified that the main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police misconduct.52
As the Calandra majority stated, “[T]he rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”53 As a
deterrence mechanism, the exclusionary rule is not intended
for individual deterrence and rehabilitation but, in contrast,
focuses on institutional deterrence aimed at correcting the
future conduct of the police force as a whole.54 Furthermore,
the Court determined that the exclusionary rule is not
applicable in all cases where evidence is illegally obtained.55
Rather, a balancing test must be conducted to see if the
49

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364, U.S. 206, 217

(1960)).
50

Id. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
51
Id. at 655, 660.
52
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (holding that evidence
that was seized outside the scope of the warrant at the defendant’s place of business
does not qualify him to refuse to testify in grand jury proceedings on the grounds that
the evidence was obtained unlawfully and should be suppressed in accordance with the
exclusionary rule). The Court’s decision in Calandra appears to be grounded in the
precedent of Elkins v. United States. Id. at 347; see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
53
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added) (explaining how the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is not to remedy the injury to privacy that resulted from an
illegal search, but rather to prevent future police misconduct). Additionally, in
supporting the main objective of police deterrence, the Court suggested, “that the
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served.” Id.
54
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (holding that although the
evidence was obtained illegally, the officers acted in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant and therefore the evidence need not be suppressed at trial). Additionally, Leon
established the Good Faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 922-23.
55
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
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deterrence benefit of applying the exclusionary rule outweighs
the costs generated by its use.56 The Court indicated that costs
of the exclusionary rule include the possibility that the guilty
go free or, at the very least, that defendants will use the error
to plea bargain for a reduced sentence.57 On the other hand, as
effective deterrence mechanisms focus on creating incentives to
prevent police misconduct, the Court determined that the
exclusionary rule’s deterrence benefits should be applied when
“the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some
right.”58 Therefore, by suppressing evidence gained as a result
of officer’s unlawful behavior, the Court encourages a “greater
degree of care toward the rights of an accused.”59
Thus, with respect to preventing future police misconduct, the exclusionary rule’s deterrence mechanism is crucial
in safeguarding an individual’s constitutional rights. This Note
suggests that it is this focus on institutional deterrence that
makes the exclusionary rule the only viable and effective
remedy for knock-and-announce violations.60 Because other
deterrence mechanisms have proven ineffective, it is only
through the procedural incentives of the exclusionary rule that
police behavior will be rectified.61
III.

HUDSON V. MICHIGAN

In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule
is admissible at trial and can be used to prove a defendant’s
guilt.62 In reaching this conclusion, the Court failed to extend
the exclusionary rule, a doctrine that orders that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment be suppressed at
trial.63 In Hudson, Michigan police officers obtained a warrant
permitting the search of defendant Brooker T. Hudson’s home
56
See id.; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07 (Leon contains an in-depth
analysis of the cost-benefit analysis. The Calandra case establishes that a balancing
test is necessary to determine when the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy
and it requires that the costs and benefits must be weighed.).
57
Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
58
Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).
59
Id.
60
See infra Part V.
61
See infra Part V.
62
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
63
Id.
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for drugs and firearms.64 Upon executing the warrant on
August 27, 1998, the police arrived at Hudson’s door and
announced their presence but did not knock.65 The officers then
waited only three to five seconds before opening Hudson’s
unlocked door and entering his home.66 Inside police recovered
drugs, including cocaine rocks found in Hudson’s pocket, and a
loaded gun that police discovered between the cushion and
armrest of the chair in which Hudson was seated.67
Consequently, police charged Hudson with unlawful drug and
firearm possession in violation of Michigan state law.68
Hudson subsequently moved to suppress the evidence.69
He argued that the police’s premature entry did not comply
with the knock-and-announce rule and, therefore, violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.70 The trial court granted Hudson’s
motion to suppress the evidence, but the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed the decision upon interlocutory review.71 In
making this determination, the Michigan Court of Appeals
followed Michigan Supreme Court precedent and concluded
that suppression was not the appropriate remedy when police
gathered evidence in violation of the knock-and-announce rule
but pursuant to a valid search warrant.72 Subsequently, the
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and Hudson
was convicted of drug possession and sentenced to eighteen
months probation.73 Following his conviction, Hudson renewed
his Fourth Amendment claim on appeal, but the Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.74 Thereafter, the
Michigan Supreme Court once again denied review, and on
January 27, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.75
The question before the Court was whether the exclusionary
rule applied to evidence that police obtained in violation of the
64

Id. at 588.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support
of Respondent at 2, Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 (No. 04-1360) [hereinafter CJLF Brief].
66
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589. See People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 64 (1999)
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained in violation of
the knock-and-announce requirement).
73
CJLF Brief, supra note 65, at 2; see also Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589.
74
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589.
75
CJLF Brief, supra note 65, at 2.
65
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knock-and-announce rule, and therefore was required to be
suppressed at trial.76 Justice Scalia, in writing the opinion for
the Court, declared that evidence seized in violation of the
knock-and-announce rule need not be suppressed.77
Although the majority opinion contains four separate
discussions, this Note will focus on the Court’s argument that
the substantial costs generated by applying the exclusionary
rule outweigh its deterrence benefits.78 The Court’s opinion
began by acknowledging that the knock-and-announce rule
stems from common law principles and is now a command of
the Fourth Amendment.79 In relying on case law that has
shaped both the exclusionary rule and the knock-and-announce
rule, the Court explained why this type of violation does not
warrant suppression.
First, Justice Scalia addressed the causation argument
that suggests a court can admit evidence at trial that would not
have been discovered “but-for” police misconduct if the causal
connection between the misconduct and seizing of the evidence
is notably attenuated.80 Following this principle, Scalia
suggested that the exclusion of evidence should not occur
automatically, even though a constitutional violation was the
but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.81 Accordingly, Scalia
believed that even if there is a direct causal connection
between the evidence obtained and the illegal entry, the
evidence should only be suppressed when suppression would
directly remedy the constitutional interests violated. In
Hudson, Scalia determined that the officers’ illegal entry by
failing to knock and announce was not a but-for cause of
obtaining the evidence because police would have ultimately
seized the evidence pursuant to the execution of a search
warrant.82 As Scalia noted, “Whether that preliminary misstep
had occurred or not, the police would have executed the
76

Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590.
Id. at 594.
78
See id. at 594-600.
79
See id. at 589; see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)
(holding that whether an officer followed the knock-and-announce rule forms part of
the reasonableness inquiry as to whether a search is valid under the Fourth
Amendment).
80
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592-94; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484-85 (1963) (holding that verbal evidence seized in violation of an unlawful
entry and arrest is considered “‘fruits’ of the agents’ unlawful action” and therefore
must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule).
81
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592-93.
82
Id.
77
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warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the
guns and drugs inside the house.”83 Moreover, Scalia asserted
that the exclusionary rule is not designed to safeguard evidence
from the government84 and stated, “Since the interests that
were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of
the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”85
Second, Scalia noted that the exclusionary rule is only
applied when the deterrence benefits outweigh the social costs
generated by its application.86 Here, Scalia found that the social
costs of applying the exclusionary rule were substantial and
significantly outweighed the deterrence effects on police
misconduct.87 Scalia alleged that the social costs of applying the
exclusionary rule were twofold. First, it would allow criminals
go free because evidence of their guilt was suppressed.88
Second, it would produce a flood of cases where individuals
would claim that either officers violated the knock-andannounce rule or that the various exceptions that permit
officers not to knock were inapplicable.89 In contrast, Scalia
suggested that the deterrence benefits of preventing police
officer misconduct would be nominal and that other remedies
were available to ensure police acted responsibly.90 In
particular, Scalia noted both the availability of civil rights suits
against police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as the
“internal discipline” and “increasing professionalism” of police
forces.91
83

Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
Id.
85
Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
86
Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (stating
that the exclusionary rule should be applied when the effect of deterring police
misconduct outweighs the social costs generated by applying the rule).
87
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 595-96.
90
Id. at 596-99.
91
Id. Section 1983 of the U.S. Code provides citizens a cause of action:
84

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
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In relying on the availability of civil remedies against
police officers, the majority concluded that the potential threat
of being confronted with a civil rights suit for officer misconduct would significantly deter law enforcement officials
from violating knock-and-announce guidelines.92 The majority
rejected the notion that courts do not award significant
damages in civil-right suits against law enforcement officials.93
Rather, the Court reasoned that Congress has made it easier to
bring such suits by approving attorney fees in civil rights
proceedings and that lawyers are now more disposed to taking
on these types of cases.94 Additionally, the Court found that the
internal discipline of today’s police forces will ensure that
officers abide by the guidelines set out in the knock-andannounce requirement and respect individuals’ constitutional
rights when executing search warrants at their homes.95 As
Scalia noted, there are “[n]umerous sources . . . now available
to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of
them under this Court’s cases, how to respect constitutional
guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an effective
regime for internal discipline.”96
Lastly, Scalia discussed how the Court’s holding in
Hudson is consistent with pre-existing law governing the rules

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
92
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596-97.
93
Id. at 597-98.
94
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section 1988(b) authorizes attorney fees in
the following circumstances:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42
U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs,
including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such
officer’s jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). Moreover, the Court asserted that because cases are settled,
it may appear that the lower courts are not going forward with civil rights suits against
officers. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598.
95
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-99.
96
Id. at 599.
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of suppression.97 Scalia focused on the cases Segura v. United
States,98 New York v. Harris,99 and United States v. Ramirez100
to support his conclusion. Like Hudson, Segura v. United
States also involved an illegal entry.101 In Segura, the officers
did not have a search warrant, did not knock, and did not
receive permission to enter the defendant’s apartment.102 Due
to delays in obtaining a warrant, police had to wait nineteen
hours inside Segura’s apartment until they received a valid
warrant and could lawfully conduct a search.103 The Supreme
Court denied Segura’s motion to suppress the evidence
gathered, and held that the grounds on which the warrant was
granted did not relate in any way to the police’s illegal entry.104
Accordingly, the Court found that there was an independent
source for the warrant under which the evidence was obtained,
and therefore suppression of the evidence was not required.105
Scalia concluded that if the evidence obtained as a result of the

97

See id. at 599-602.
468 U.S. 796 (1984).
99
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
100
523 U.S. 65 (1998).
101
Segura, 468 U.S. at 798.
102
Id. at 800.
103
Id. at 801.
104
Id. at 814.
105
Id. at 816. In Segura, the Court stated that “the exclusionary rule has no
application [where] the Government learned of the evidence from an independent
source.” Id. at 805 (1984) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920) (alteration in original)). Accordingly, Silverthorne describes the usage
of the independent source doctrine:
98

The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is not merely evidence so required shall not be used before the Court but
that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts
thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the
knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the
way proposed.
Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392. Additionally, in Segura, the search warrant
was based upon the testimony of Rivudalla-Vidal who told agents that he had bought
cocaine from Segura that day and had plans to meet with the defendant later that
evening to receive an additional supply. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 800. The Court
deemed the illegality of the initial entry irrelevant by applying the “but-for” causation
test. The Court relied on precedent stating that “evidence will not be excluded as ‘fruit’
unless the illegality is at least the ‘but for’ cause of the discovery of the evidence.” Id. at
815. Accordingly, the Court determined that because “[t]he illegal entry into the
petitioner’s apartment did not contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized
under warrant; it is clear, therefore, that not even the threshold ‘but for’ requirement
was met in this case.” Id.
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illegal entry in Segura was not suppressed, then it would be
“bizarre to treat more harshly the evidence in this case.”106
In New York v. Harris, the police arrested Harris in his
home without a warrant.107 This illegal arrest, however, did not
require the suppression of an incriminating statement Harris
had made at the station house.108 In Harris, the Supreme Court
determined that the statement made at the station house was
not a result of the defendant’s being in “unlawful custody.”109
Accordingly, although he had made the statement after a
warrantless and non-consensual entry into the defendant’s
home, the exclusionary rule did not bar it.110 In comparison,
Scalia stated, “While acquisition of the gun and drugs [in
Hudson] was the product of a search pursuant to warrant, it
was not the fruit of the fact that the entry was not preceded by
knock and announce.”111
Lastly, in United States v. Ramirez, the Court found
that although unnecessary destruction to property may trigger
a Fourth Amendment violation, the circumstances of Ramirez
did not produce such a result.112 The Court did note, however,
that if the police’s destruction of property was unreasonable, a
causation test would be applied to determine if there was a
causal relationship between the property damage and the
evidence obtained, which would justify suppression.113 In citing
Ramirez, Scalia asked, “[W]hat clearer expression could there
be of the proposition that an impermissible manner of entry
does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule?”114
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supported two major
claims of the majority’s opinion: (1) the knock-and-announce
rule does not meet the causation requirement that limits the
application of the exclusionary rule; and (2) civil suits and the
106

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 600 (2006).
Id. at 601.
108
Id. The incriminating statement in question was a written inculpatory
statement signed by Harris after he was arrested and taken to the station house. New
York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 16 (1990).
109
Harris, 495 U.S. at 19.
110
Id. at 21.
111
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 601.
112
Id. at 602. In Ramirez, police entered the defendant’s home pursuant to a
“no-knock warrant.” Upon being informed that the defendant had guns and drugs in
his garage, the police believed the best method of entry would be to break a window in
the garage and exhibit their guns to try and deter the defendant from attempting to
use his weapons. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 68-69 (2006).
113
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 602.
114
Id.
107
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internal discipline of police officers serve as effective deterrence
remedies for knock-and-announce violations.115 Furthermore,
Kennedy asserted that the knock-and-announce rule is still
very much the law and if the Court’s decision led to a
“widespread pattern of violations . . . and particularly if those
violations were committed against persons who lacked the
means or voice to mount effective protest,”116 that the Court’s
decision in Hudson would have to be revisited.117 Justice
Kennedy, however, did not agree with the majority’s reliance
on Segura and Harris.118
Justice Breyer wrote a powerful dissent asserting that
not only did the majority’s decision take away the incentive to
follow the knock-and-announce requirement, but it did so
without any support from past precedent.119 First, Breyer
believed that the majority should have applied the exclusionary
rule, and he stated that the Court’s decision “weakens, perhaps
destroys, much of the practical value of the Constitution’s
knock-and-announce protection.”120 Second, Breyer criticized
the majority’s reliance on civil suits and internal discipline
as effective deterrence methods for knock-and-announce violations.121 He noted that the majority failed to cite any cases
where a plaintiff has received substantial monetary damages
for knock-and-announce violations.122 Moreover, he reasoned
115

Id. at 602-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 604.
117
See id.
118
Id. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy simply states, “[W]hile I am not
convinced that Segura v. United States and New York v. Harris have as much relevance
here as Justice Scalia appears to conclude, the Court’s holding is fully supported by
Parts I through III of its opinion. I accordingly join those Parts and concur in
judgment.” Id.
119
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 604-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Additionally, in
supporting his opinion that the majority departed from past precedent, Breyer included
in the appendix the decisions of all the Fourth Amendment cases that the Supreme
Court has decided since the exclusionary rule was established. See id. at 630-32.
Breyer apparently used these cases to emphasize that, notwithstanding the established
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, “in every case involving evidence seized during an
illegal search of a home (federally since Weeks, nationally since Mapp) the Court, with
the exceptions mentioned, has either explicitly or implicitly upheld (or required) the
suppression of the evidence.” Id. at 613. For discussions of the exceptions mentioned,
see id. at 611-14.
120
Id. at 605.
121
Id. at 608-14.
122
Id. at 610-11. Breyer notes:
116

To argue, as the majority does, that new remedies, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983
actions or better trained police, make suppression unnecessary is to argue
that Wolf, not Mapp, is now the law. To argue that there may be few civil
suits because violations may produce nothing “more than nominal injury” is
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that the qualified immunity defense available to police officers
makes it difficult for individuals to bring suits against them,
and thus, civil claims are not an adequate replacement for the
exclusionary rule.123 Third, Breyer rejected the Court’s but-for
analysis, finding that the evidence obtained in Hudson resulted
from the police’s illegal entry into Hudson’s home.124 As Breyer
argued, “it is not true that, had the illegal entry not occurred,
‘police would have discovered the guns and drugs inside the
house.’ Without that unlawful entry they would have not been
inside the house; so there would have been no discovery.”125
Fourth, Breyer emphasized the fact that the knock-andannounce rule is designed to safeguard an individual’s privacy
in his or her home from government intrusion.126 He believed
that the majority’s opinion consequently undermined this right,
which is central to the Fourth Amendment.127 Finally, Breyer
to confirm, not to deny, the inability of civil suits to deter violations. And to
argue without evidence . . . that civil suits may provide deterrence because
claims may “have been settled” is perhaps to search in desperation for an
argument. Rather, the majority, as it candidly admits, has simply “assumed”
that “[a]s far as [it] know[s], civil liability is an effective deterrent,” a
support-free assumption that Mapp and subsequent cases make clear does
not embody the Court’s normal approach to difficult questions of Fourth
Amendment law.
Id. at 611 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
123
Id. at 610. The defense of qualified immunity provides that “government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The rationale of the qualified immunity defense has two prongs: “[I]t
allows officials to carry out their duties confidently, without fear of incurring
unexpected liability, and it allows courts to dispose of insubstantial claims prior to
trial, sparing officials from unnecessary litigation.” Pounds v. Griepenstroh, 970 F.2d
338, 340 (7th Cir. 1992) (alteration in original). Thus, in determining if an officer is
entitled to the qualified immunity defense, the court must make a two part inquiry.
First, do the plaintiff’s allegations establish a violation of a constitutional right, and
second, was the constitutional right clearly established at the time of the injury?
Kathryn R. Urbonya, Selected Fourth Amendment Issues in Section 1983 Litigation, in
2 14TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 67, 101 (Hon. George C. Pratt
& Martin A. Schwartz eds., 1988). This two prong test is an objective standard that
assumes liability if a reasonable officer would have or should have known, given the
same circumstances and the law at the time, that his or her actions were violating a
clearly established law. See id. If a court finds that the qualified immunity defense
applies, officers are saved from the burdens of litigation and do not have to stand trial.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001).
124
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125
Id. at 618 (quoting Justice Scalia, id. at 592 (majority opinion)).
126
Id. at 620-21.
127
Id. Supporting his conclusions, Breyer cited a Court decision from this year
(2006) which emphasized the longstanding importance that the Court has placed on an
individual’s privacy interests in regards to their home. As Breyer asserted, “[J]ust this
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rejected the majority’s application of Segura, Harris, and
Ramirez, and found they did not lend support to the proposition
that suppression is unwarranted when a knock-and-announce
violation occurs.128
IV.

WHAT DETERRENCE? AN EXAMINATION OF THE
INCREASED PROFESSIONALISM AND DISCIPLINE
OF TODAY’S POLICE FORCES

In 1963, Justice Brennan warned of the risks of
weakening the knock-and-announce rule:
[P]ractical hazards of law enforcement militate strongly against any
relaxation of the requirement of awareness. First, cases of mistaken
identity are surely not novel in the investigation of crime. The
possibility is very real that the police may be misinformed . . . [t]hat
possibility is itself a good reason for holding a tight rein against
judicial approval of unannounced police entries into private homes.
Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion. Second, the
requirement of awareness also serves to minimize the hazards of the
officers’ dangerous calling.129

It appears that Brennan’s message is even more pertinent
today, as paramilitary units have become increasingly involved
in local police activity.130 The majority in Hudson found that the
term we have reiterated that ‘it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special
protection as the center of the private lives of our people.’” Id. at 621 (quoting Georgia
v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006)).
128
See id. at 624-28. In rejection of Segura v. United States, Breyer reasoned
that the majority erred in its application of the “independent source doctrine.” Id. at
625-26. He found that, in Hudson, “[t]he search that produced the relevant evidence
here is the very search that the knock-and-announce violation rendered unlawful.
There simply is no ‘independent source.’” Id. at 625. Furthermore, Breyer found the
facts of New York v. Harris inconsistent with Hudson. Id. at 626. In Harris, the parties
agreed that any incriminating evidence that was obtained in Harris’ home as a result
of his arrest should be excluded. Id. at 627. Thus, the only question at trial was
whether the written statement made by Harris at the stationhouse was subject to
suppression. Id. In Hudson, on the other hand, the evidence was obtained after the
police did not knock and announce. Id. at 628. Breyer contends that “[t]he officers’
failure to knock and announce rendered the entire search unlawful, and that unlawful
search led to the discovery of the evidence in petitioner’s home.” Id. (citation omitted).
Lastly, Breyer distinguished Hudson from United States v. Ramirez by stating that the
entry in Hudson was illegal, in contrast to that in Ramirez, which was not. Id. at 628.
129
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
130
See BALKO, supra note 10 (discussing the increasing militarism of civilian
police officers and the substitution of SWAT team raids for common police work); see
also Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 13, at 623 (discussing the growth of small local
paramilitary police units with the local police force); Steven G. Brandl, Back to the
Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law Enforcement Practice and
Policy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 145-48 (2003) (discussing the history of policing and
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potential deterrence benefits that would result from applying
the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations did not
outweigh the social costs generated by its use.131 In justifying
this conclusion, the majority emphasized that the increased
professionalism of law enforcement officials serves to deter
police misconduct and guarantee that officers adhere to
governing procedures.132 In particular, the majority noted a
“new emphasis on internal police discipline,”133 reflected by
“increasing evidence that police forces across the United States
take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously. There have
been ‘wide-ranging reforms in education, training and supervision of police officers.’”134 This Note argues that the increased
internal discipline of today’s police force advocated by the
Court is not as evident as the majority suggests.135
the current militarization of the police force); David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman,
Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster and Militarization of American Law
Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV., 619, 649-50 (1997) (discussing the increased
militarization of the police force).
131
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594. In Mapp v. Ohio the Court chose to extend the
exclusionary rule to the states, recognizing the importance of having effective deterrent
means to prevent police misconduct and uphold individuals’ constitutional rights. 367
U.S. 648, 660 (1961). In Mapp, the Court affirmed the assertion that “[t]he efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law.” Id. at 648 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1916)). Furthermore, the Court in Mapp stated that post Weeks, “This Court has ever since required of
federal law officers a strict adherence to that command which this Court has held to be
a clear, specific, and constitutionally required—even if judicially implied—deterrent
safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been
reduced to a ‘form of words.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). Accordingly, in Wilson v. Arkansas the knockand-announce rule became constitutionally mandated that police officers must follow to
ensure an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. See 514 U.S. at 937. Thus, it appears
that the Court in Hudson not only went against the reasoning of Mapp, but applied
deterrence mechanisms that appear ineffective. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 609-10 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
132
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598.
133
Id. at 599 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL
OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 51 (1993)).
134
Id.
135
See Sewell Chan, Mayor’s Report Finds a Safe and Healthy City, But One
with Troubles, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at B3. For example, findings for New
York City’s Mayor’s Management Report for 2006 indicated that there were 7,373
civilian complaints against police officers for the year. This was a 16% increase from
2005, when 6,358 complaints were filed. See Graham Rayman, Cops in the Clear/ExInvestigators: Board Policy Absolves Police in Bad Raid, NEWSDAY, June 9, 2003, at A3.
Additionally, in New York City a Civilian Complaint Review Board was established in
1993 to recommend sanctions on misconduct that is reported by the public. Id. The
agency receives a significant number of complaints regarding no-knock raids, and
interviews with former Review Board investigators reveal that no-knock complaints
have been a problem for some time. Id. Moreover, it was reported that “where
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The difference in function between civilian law enforcement officials and the military is rooted in our country’s
history.136 Whereas the military’s primary function was to
protect our country from external enemies, law enforcement
officials were charged with keeping domestic peace.137 Today,
the line that separates the military and local police departments has been blurred as police officers execute a more
militaristic style of law enforcement.138 This is a consequence
of Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) teams or similar
paramilitary units139 playing a more active role in addressing
local community problems.140 As a result, local police forces
investigators tried to raise the issue, they encountered resistance from supervisors who
believed such an inquiry was outside agency jurisdiction . . . .” Id. If civilians are told to
report to the Review Board and the Review Board is given little power to enact change,
what is the proper recourse if internal sanctions are not being—and possibly cannot
be—given?
136
See Kopel & Blackman, supra note 130, at 649-55.
137
Id. In discussing the problems of the military in law enforcement functions,
Col. Charles J. Dunlap noted, “military training is aimed at killing people and breaking
things . . . [p]olice forces, on the other hand take an entirely different approach. They
have to exercise the studied restraint that a judicial process requires; they gather
evidence and arrest ‘suspects’ . . . [t]hese are two different views of the world.” BALKO,
supra note 10 (quoting Col. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The Thick Green Line: The Growing
Involvement of Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement, MILITARIZING THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM at 35).
138
WEBER, supra note 13, at 11.
139
Other names for paramilitary units include: “Special Response Team
(SRT), Emergency Response Team (ERT), Special Emergency Response Teams (SERT),
Emergency Services Unit (ESU) . . . .” Karan R. Singh, Note, Trending the Thin Blue
Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 673, 680 (2001).
140
See supra note 130; see also Kopel & Blackman, supra note 130, at 649-55.
The military has not always been permitted to take part in police functions. WEBER,
supra note 13, at 2-5. At first, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was designed by
Congress to prevent the intrusion of the military in civilian law enforcement affairs,
and as amended in 1994, provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the
Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Brandl, supra note 130, at 146-47. Over time, this act was subsequently amended to
include a variety of exceptions where it is proper for the military to aid the local police
force. Specifically, in 1981 the “war on drugs” exception established that military
personnel can be used in executing a search warrant at an individual’s home in pursuit
of illegal contraband. As Congress was going through the process of amending the
Posse Comitatus Act, military officials did try to warn of the harmful side effects that
would result. The deputy assistant secretary for drug policy, Stephen G. Olmstead,
argued to a U.S Senate subcommittee that “[o]ne of [America’s] greatest strengths is
that the military is responsive to civilian authority and that we do not allow the Army,
Navy, and the Marines and the Air Force to be a police force. History is replete with
countries that allow that to happen. Disaster is the result.” BALKO, supra note 10, at 16
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen G. Olmstead in George C.
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are now conducting no-knock, military-style raids when
carrying out search warrants.141 Moreover, statistics reflect that
a rise in the use of these paramilitary units corresponds with
an escalation of unnecessary violence and wrong-door raids.142
Accordingly, it appears the police discipline and professionalism emphasized by the Court in Hudson is failing to limit
this aggressive and violent behavior.

Wilson, Agencies Intensify Battle to Secure Key Roles In Anti Drug Effort, WASH.
POST, Apr. 28, 1987). Nonetheless, the amendment was made and the military was
permitted to take part in local police enforcement that involved the seizing of
contraband.
Accordingly, although paramilitary units were first established in the
1960s in Los Angeles, it was not until the 1980s that these units gained momentum.
Prior to the 1980s, paramilitary units were used only in the most volatile and high risk
environments, such as hijackings or hostage situations. At this time, SWAT units
consisted of small teams which greatly resembled police officers, only they had slightly
better equipment. As the country became increasingly concerned about the proliferation of drugs since the 1970s, statistics show a corresponding rise in the use of these
paramilitary units.
141
See generally BALKO, supra note 10.
142
See generally id.; see also The Sultans of SWAT, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2,
1999, (discussing the growth of SWAT teams and violence within the local police force).
A study conducted by Peter Kraska on paramilitary units reflects their proliferation in
today’s civil law enforcement agencies: Today, 77% of police departments surveyed
have paramilitary units, which is approximately a 48% increase since 1985. Kraska &
Cubellis, supra note 13, at 620. In 1996, Kraska and his colleague Victor Kappeler
conducted a study of police departments that patrol cities of 50,000 or more citizens,
and found that almost 90% of the police departments surveyed had paramilitary units,
compared to about 59% in 1982. Brandl, supra note 130, at 147 (548 agencies
responded to the survey, a 79% response rate). Moreover, Kraska and Kappeler
documented the rise in call outs, or deployments, of these units and found that the
number increased from thirteen call outs per unit in 1980 to fifty-three per unit in
1995. Id. A call out or deployment of a unit is used in a variety of circumstances
including: “barricaded persons, hostages, terrorists, civil disturbances, and the serving
of a high-risk search and arrest warrant. [This] data does not included activities
related to proactive patrol work by PPUs [or paramilitary units.]” Kraska & Cubellis,
supra note 13, at 614. What was even more startling was that 75% of the call outs were
for the execution of a search warrant, which typically took the form of a “no-knock”
raid. Lastly, the study indicated that over the last twenty-five years, the use of SWAT
team units for proactive patrol has increased nearly 300%. Id.
Additionally, Kraska conducted a study with Louis Cubellis to determine
the increased use of paramilitary units among smaller police departments where there
were approximately 25,000 to 50,000 citizens within each jurisdiction. Kraska &
Cubellis, supra note 13, at 611-12 (The study included 473 police departments, which is
a response rate of 72%. Additionally, there was an average of sixty-two police officers in
each department.). These smaller jurisdictions indicated an even greater rise in the use
of SWAT teams or similar agencies, as the number of paramilitary or similar units rose
157% between 1985 and 1995. Id. at 613. Additionally, the number of call outs
increased from four and a half per year for each department in 1985, to over twelve by
1995. Id. at 614. Furthermore, similar to the larger police departments surveyed, 66%
of the call outs were for warrant services, which typically took the form of a no-knock
raid. This indicated a 342% increase between 1985 and 1995 in the use of paramilitary
units to execute search warrants. Id. at 615.
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What Are Paramilitary Units?

Paramilitary units are prestigious departments within
the local police force with a sub culture all their own.143 Police
officers desire to be a part of these units because the type of
work these units perform is seen as exciting, high status,
dangerous, and bolstering of male camaraderie.144 Paramilitary
units are typically equipped in “black or urban camouflage
BDUs (battle dress uniforms), lace-up combat boots, full-body
armor, Kevlar helmets, and ninja-style hoods.”145 Additionally,
the Department of Defense has armed these men and women
with sophisticated military hardware146 including: “submachine
guns, tactical shotguns, sniper rifles, percussion grenades, CS
and OC gas (tear and pepper gas), surveillance equipment,
and fortified personnel carriers.”147 Furthermore, these units
function as “special military operation teams” that demand
strict discipline and rigorous internal enforcement.148 In fact,
elite military divisions, such as the Army Rangers and Navy
Seals, commonly train paramilitary units and expose them to
tactical and specialized military procedures.149
The military weaponry and advanced technology that
accompany paramilitary units have placed officers in a warriorlike mindset that is responsible for the militaristic attitude

143

Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 13, at 623.
Id. When observing the attitudes of police officers in paramilitary units, it
becomes apparent that officers are attracted to the intense, high risk environment that
is common in these units. In conducting his research, Peter Kraska interviewed two
military reserve officers who were responsible for training civilian law enforcement
personnel. These men stated that:
144

This shit [the creation of paramilitary units] is going on all over. Why serve
an arrest warrant to some crack dealer with a .38? . . . With full armor, the
right shit [pointing to a small case that contained a nine-millimeter Glock],
and training, you can kick ass and have fun . . . Most of these guys just like to
play war; they get a rush out of search-and-destroy missions instead of the
bullshit they do regularly.
BALKO, supra note 10, at 17-18 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Peter
Kraska, Playing War, in MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM at
143).
145
Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 13, at 610-11.
146
WEBER, supra note 13, at 7. For example, in 1997 alone, the Pentagon
distributed 1.2 million pieces of military equipment to civilian police forces. BALKO,
supra note 10, at 8.
147
Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 13, at 611.
148
Id. at 610.
149
See id.
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that is becoming more apparent in today’s police force.150 As one
commentator notes, the use of these units advances an “over
emphasis on the crime-fighting function of police work and
promotes a warlike approach to crime and drug problems.”151
For example, consider the typical method a paramilitary unit
employs in executing a search warrant. In most cases, a “noknock” raid occurs, in which police officers forcibly enter an
individual’s home without announcing their presence.152 Outfitted in military styled uniforms, multiple three-officer teams
make a “dynamic entry”153 by using a battering ram, explosives,
or similar device to forcibly break down a civilian’s door.154
Upon entering, officers may dispense flashbang concussion
grenades, break a window or possibly release a chemical spray
to create a diversion.155 Additionally, officers are equipped with
ammunition, such as automatic submachine guns, assault
rifles, or 9-mm shotguns, to create fear and ensure compliance.156 These tactics, which turn police officers into “soldiers,”
produce grave consequences because “[t]he sharing of training
and technology by the military and law enforcement agencies
has produced a . . . mindset of the warrior . . . simply not
appropriate for the civilian police officer charged with enforcing
the law.”157 Accordingly, officers forget that they are not
150

WEBER, supra note 13, at 10. See Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 13, at 610-

11, 619.
151

Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 13, at 609. Additionally, as “[d]epartmental
SWAT teams have accepted the military as a model for their behavior and outlook . . .
American streets are viewed as the ‘front’ and American citizens as the ‘enemy.’”
WEBER, supra note 13, at 10.
152
See BALKO, supra note 10, at 3-4. These no-knock raids can be pursuant to
a no-knock warrant which many jurisdictions administer. Id.
153
The name “dynamic entry” is used due to the force and instantaneous
matter of entry. Singh, supra note 139, at 682. Note that pursuant to Richards v.
Wisconsin, a no-knock raid is lawful only if exigent circumstances are present. 520 U.S.
385, 394 (1997).
154
William Booth, Exploding Number of SWAT Teams Sets Off Alarms;
Critics See Growing Role of Heavily Armed Police Units as ‘Militarization’ of Law
Enforcement, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at A1 (discussing the rise of SWAT teams
among local police departments); see Michael J. Bulzomi, Knock and Announce: A
Fourth Amendment Standard, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. (May 1997), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/1997/may976.htm (discussing how law enforcement
agencies can conduct “no-knock” entries in compliance with the Constitution). In cases
where doors are reinforced shut, they may be removed by chaining the door to a tow
truck that effectively yanks the door off. Singh, supra note 139, at 682.
155
See Booth, supra note 154.
156
See BALKO, supra note 10, at 14.
157
WEBER, supra note 13, at 10. See BALKO, supra note 10, at 15. Balko
argues that “[g]iven that civilian police now tote military equipment, get military
training, and embrace military culture and values, it shouldn’t be surprising when

2008]

THEY WON’T COME KNOCKING NO MORE

1233

challenging an enemy, but rather, citizens who are entitled to
protection of their constitutional rights.158
B.

A Consequence of Paramilitary Units: The Rise in
Wrong-Door Raids

The consequences of civilian police officers acting like
military personnel are untoward for both the citizens whose
rights are impeded and for the officers themselves.159 The rise
in the number of paramilitary units has led to an increase in
“wrong-door raids,” which, as the name indicates, are forced,
sometimes militaristic, entries perpetrated against innocent
individuals due to police mistakes in executing a search
warrant.160 Wrong-door raids are most commonly the result of
misinformation by a police informant who exchanges confidential information for money or a reduced sentence in his or her
own case.161 It is hard to determine just how many wrong-door
officers begin to act like soldiers, treat civilians like combatants and tread on private
property as if it were part of a battlefield.” Id.
158
Weber, supra note 13, at 10.
159
See supra Part IV.A.
160
BALKO, supra note 10, at 26-29. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
It appears that as early as 1962, in Ker v. California, the Supreme Court recognized
that the relaxation of the knock-and-announce rule can lead to mistaken raids.
161
BALKO, supra note 10, at 21-25. Reports of recent wrong-door raids include
the following: On September 12, 1996, seventy-year-old Ana Roman returned to her
home to find police, with their guns pointed at the heads of her family, conducting a
raid based on an informant’s false tip. Melissa Grace, Raid-Snafu Trial to Open Suit
Blames Cops for Women’s Death 6 Yrs. Later, DAILY NEWS, suburban sec., June 1, 2004,
at 3. As a result, Roman had a heart attack and spent two weeks in the cardiac unit of
Lutheran Medical Center. Id. On June 25, 2003, police and FBI agents “broke down the
door to an apartment of a frail man, Timothy Brockman, threw a stun grenade inside—
setting a carpet on fire—then ordered him out of bed, and handcuffed him as he lay
face down.” Jim Dwyer, Police Raid Gone Awry: A Muddled Path to the Wrong-door,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at B27. The police and federal agents failed to discover that
an informant had identified the wrong apartment in a housing complex. Id. A wrongdoor raid took place at the apartment of Rosanna Samuel on the morning of May 24,
2001 as a result of mistaken information by an informant. Graham Rayman, Raid That
Changed Her Life, NEWSDAY, June 29, 2003, at A2. Samuel was eating breakfast when
officers “pried her apartment’s door from its hinges, dropped in a flash grenade that
emitted a bright light and loud noise and burst in.” Id. Samuel, a heavyset woman, had
trouble getting to the ground, so police removed her legs from under her. Samuel
sustained bruises to her face, knees and elbows and was admitted to Kings County
Hospital for treatment. Id. On February 27, 1998, police mistakenly raided the
apartment of Shaunsia Patterson, who was eight months pregnant and living with her
two- and three-year-old children. Bob Herbert, In America, Reprise of Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at A27. Patterson’s fifteen-year-old sister was also home at the
time. Id. The police entered her apartment in teams with their guns drawn, after a
loud boom brought her door down. Id. Although visibly pregnant, Patterson stated they
“threw me face down on the floor and handcuffed me behind my back . . . one of the
cops stepped on the side of my face and pressed my face into the floor.” Id. She could
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raids have occurred, as police do not always keep track of their
mistakes and homeowners do not consistently come forward.162
One study suggests, however, that almost 200 wrong-door cases
have been reported in the last fifteen years, which resulted in
at least forty innocent deaths.163 Police officials have
rationalized these mistaken raids as an unavoidable outcome of
the “war on drugs.”164
One significant consequence of wrong-door raids is that
unnecessary violence may ensue between police officers and
homeowners.165 SWAT team raids often occur in the early
morning or late evening when occupants are asleep.166
Moreover, officers typically do not knock and announce their
presence, and diversionary tactics make it difficult for a
homeowner to affirm who is at the door.167 Consequently, when

not ask cops why they were there, because whenever she spoke, they told her to “Shut
the [expletive] up!” Id. They destroyed her house in search of drugs, verbally abused
her, kept her and her sister handcuffed for more than two hours, and never even
showed her a warrant. Id.
162
BALKO, supra note 10, at 28. In 1999, then Attorney General Janet Reno
even affirmed that although the 1994 Crime Control Act required the federal
government to compile information on police shootings and use of non-deadly forces,
there was no law requiring that local police agencies hand over this information. Id.
163
Radley Balko & Joel Berger, Wrong Door, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2006; see
also Sure Let’s Open the Door for SWAT Teams, OAKLAND TRIB., June 22, 2006, Sports
Turn at 2.
164
BALKO, supra note 10, at 21-26, 29. Reports of such justifications include
the following: After a couple was hospitalized as a result of the police’s forcibly entry of
their home thinking it was a methamphetamine laboratory, Police Chief Darryl
Whaley said “[O]bviously, a mistake was made and it is regrettable . . . [b]ut I stand by
my officers.”. Associated Press, Elderly Couple Hurt in Raid On Wrong House by Horn
Lake Police, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 23, 2006. Whaley believed “they
acted correctly and followed procedures when they entered [the couple’s] home.” Id. In
Crown Heights, Brooklyn, N.Y., police mistakenly raided the apartment of Basil
Shorter and his family. Michael Cooper, Scared Family Says Police Raided the Wrong
Home, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at B1. The police “broke down the door . . . tossed a
stun grenade into the front hall and handcuffed everyone inside, including a mentally
retarded 18-year-old girl who was taking a shower.” Id. Police asserted, however, that
they did nothing wrong in following an informant’s tip that led them to the wrong
apartment. Id.
165
BALKO, supra note 10, at 19-20.
166
Id. at 19. These early morning or late evening raids contribute to violence
because homeowners are more likely to think the police intrusion is a burglar
attempting to rob their home. See infra notes 168-169.
167
BALKO, supra note 10, at 19-20. It appears that the Supreme Court is
aware of the possibility that residents may act in self-defense when an unannounced
entry occurs. The Court stated that one of the main purposes of the knock-andannounce rule is “protection of life and limb, because an unannounced entry may
provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.” Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313
n.12 (1958) (“Compliance is also a safeguard for the police themselves who might be
mistaken for prowlers and be shot down by a fearful householder.”).
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police officers burst into an individual’s home the officers may
be mistaken for robbers. A shoot-out then may transpire
between the homeowner and officer as an individual reaches
for his or her gun in an act of self-defense.168 As a result,
innocent lives of both civilians and police officers are put at
risk.169

168

BALKO, supra note 10. The following two examples illustrate instances
where a resident thought police officers searching his or her home were intruders and
fired at them in self-protection, leading the police to return fire. Lewis Cauthorne
reportedly thought that a police search of her home for drugs was a burglary, and
Cauthorne fired at four officers in an act of self-protection. Allison Klein, Courtroom
Showman, a Champion of Defense, BALT. SUN, Nov. 23, 2002 at 1A. Police fired back,
but luckily, no one was fatally injured. Id. In another case, police raided Ellis Elliot’s
Bronx, N.Y., apartment based on information from a mistaken informant. Kit R.
Roane, Bronx Man Recounts Abuse by Police in Mistaken Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1998, at B5. The raid occurred at eight a.m. when Elliot was sleeping. Id. Not knowing
who was at the door, Elliot grabbed his gun, told whoever was at the door to move
away and when they did not, he fired his gun. Id. Elliot alleges that nine police officers
fired back twenty-six bullets into his apartment, destroyed his home, screamed racial
epithets at him and beat him. Id. As a result, Elliot sued the city. Peter Noel, NYPD
Storm Troopers, VILLAGE VOICE, May 16, 2000, at 27.
169
BALKO, supra note 10, at 19-29. The following occurrences depict the
unfortunate fatalities that can occur as a result of wrong-door raids. On March 25,
1994, a wrong-door raid took place at the home of Rev. Accelyne Williams. Robyn E.
Blumner, Court Signals Loosening of the Last Reins of Police, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 25, 2006, at 4. As a result of incorrect information given by an informant, thirteen
members of the Boston SWAT team forcibly entered Williams’s apartment. Id.
Williams, age seventy-five, subsequently died of a heart attack after struggling with
the SWAT team members. Id. On March 26, 2001, police executed a warrant at a
duplex building. Jerry Mitchell, Was There Justice For, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson,
Miss.), Mar. 5, 2006, at A1. The warrant listed the name of Jamie Smith, who occupied
one apartment, but not Cory Maye, who occupied the other. Id. Police alleged that they
knocked and announced their presence, but received no answer and then broke down
the door. Id. Maye was sleeping at the time with his eighteen-month-old daughter and
asserted that he did not hear the announcement. Id. Maye grabbed his gun in an act of
self-defense and fired at Officer Ron Jones, causing fatal injuries. Id. Maye, who had no
prior criminal record, was sentenced to death. Id. On May 16, 2003, misinformation by
an informant caused police to raid the Harlem, New York, home of fifty-seven-year-old
Alberta Spruill. Diane Cardwell & William K. Rashbaum, City Officials Suggest a Shot
in Police Raid was Accidental, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2003, at B1. Suprill died of a heart
attack after a police team used a flashbang grenade to forcibly enter her home. Id.
Likewise, police mistakenly raided John Adams’ home, when they were in fact
supposed to execute a search warrant at the home next door. Warren Duzak, Chief
Addresses Fatal Errors, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct.7, 2000, at A1. The officers apparently
knocked but did not identify themselves, and then they forcibly entered Adams’s home.
Id. Unaware of who was at the door, Adams met them with a shotgun. Id. The officers
claimed that Adams fired shots at them and they retaliated, but the question of
whether Adams used his gun was disputed. Id. Adams died as a result of the police
gunshots. Id. On September 29, 1999, the Denver police executed a wrong-door raid on
Ismael Mena’s home based on misinformation by an informant. Bruce Finley, Mena’s
Farm Dreams Turned to Dust Talks Start Today in No-Knock Death, DENVER POST,
Mar. 16, 2000, at A1. Mena, awoken by the police forcibly entering his apartment,
thought he was being robbed and fired three shots from his own gun. Id. As a result,
police fired eight bullets into Mena’s face, chest and arms, killing him. Id.
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Evidence suggests that the increased use of paramilitary units will continue in the future.170 When this disturbing
trend is noted in light of Hudson’s weakening of the knock-andannounce requirement, it certainly appears that the problems
of wrong-door raids and excessive police violence will become
more commonplace.171 Accordingly, it is imperative to have
guidelines in check that will curb officers’ behavior and
guarantee that they act in accordance with the law. By not
subjecting knock-and-announce violations to the exclusionary
rule, there are no real incentives to ensure that officers comply
with knock-and-announce procedures.172 It is not enough to rely
on the internal discipline of law enforcement officials, as there
is clear evidence that wrong-door raids are occurring and that
innocent lives have been lost.173 Hudson presented the Court
with the opportunity to create a true deterrence mechanism
to limit this aggressive and militaristic conduct. If officers
simply knocked and announced, then homeowners would know
who was at their door and would be better suited to deal
with police presence. By failing to uphold the exclusionary
rule for violations of the knock-and-announce rule, the Court
gave officers an incentive to ignore its prohibition against
unannounced searches. As a result, this Note argues that the
exclusionary rule must be extended to knock-and-announce
violations to make certain that an effective deterrence
mechanism is in place that guarantees that police officers are
respecting individuals’ constitutional rights when executing
search warrants.174
170
Brandl, supra note 130, at 146-47; see also Kopel & Blackman, supra note
129, at 649-55.
171
See BALKO, supra note 10; see also Radley Balko, Hard Knocks with NoKnock: Why Is It Unreasonable to Announce and Wait?, REASONONLINE: FREE MINDS
AND FREE MARKETS, June 20, 2006, http://www.reason.com/links/links062006.shtml.
I am not the first to suggest that no-knock raids will become more commonplace as a
result of Hudson. See BALKO, supra note 10, at 34 (discussing how Hudson may turn
“every drug search warrant into a no-knock raid”). I have chosen to elaborate on this
concept of no-knock raids to explain why the majority’s reasoning was in error when
they relied on the increasing professionalism of the police force to deter police
misconduct.
172
See infra Part V.B.1.
173
See supra note 169.
174
See Kopel & Blackman, supra note 130, at 649-55. In stressing the
importance of protecting against the increased militarization of the police, Kopel and
Blackman cited a powerful quote from the Eighth Circuit opinion, Bissonette v. Haig:

Civilian Rule is basic to our system of government. The use of military forced
to seize civilians can expose civilian government to the threat of military rule
and suspension of constitutional liberties. On a lesser scale, military
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A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

The studies above indicate that the professionalism of
the police force is not as effective a deterrent as the Hudson
majority suggests.175 Rather, there appears to be a rise in police
misconduct stemming from the increased use of paramilitary
units and resulting in an alarming number of wrong-door
raids.176 Consequently, it is imperative that the Court take
measures to rectify its decision in Hudson and create real
incentives that will deter unlawful police behavior. This need
for action becomes especially apparent when comparing the
knock-and-announce rule to the Miranda warnings.
In 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held
that police officers must inform suspects of their right to
remain silent before proceeding with custodial interrogation in
order to ensure that confessions were voluntary and therefore
admissible at trial.177 Due to a number of subsequent exceptions
that the Court made to the Miranda rule, law enforcement
officials felt that the original version of Miranda was
substantially weakened. As a result, certain states began to
train police to question outside Miranda by instructing officers
to continue interrogating suspects even after they invoked
their Miranda rights.178 Hence, Fifth Amendment protections
enforcement of the civil law leaves protection of vital Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights in the hands of persons who are not trained to uphold these
rights.
Id. at 621 (emphasis added) (quoting Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir.
1985)); see also Case Comment, Fourth Amendment—Exclusionary Rule—Seventh
Circuit Holds that the Suppression of Evidence Is a Disproportionately Severe Sanction
for Timing Violation of the Knock-and-Announce Requirement.—United States v.
Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 709, 713-15 (2001) (arguing
that evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce requirement needs to be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule).
175
See supra Part IV.
176
See supra Part IV.
177
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Before suspects in custody are interrogated, they are
read their Miranda Rights, consisting of four warnings: that a suspect “has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he can not afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him if he so desires.” Id. at 479. Accordingly, if evidence is
seized in violation of Miranda, its use is suppressed at trial. See United States v.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000).
178
See Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 109 (arguing that the
original vision of Miranda has been transformed, and as a result, police departments
have begun to promote a policy of questioning outside Miranda). Officers were being
trained that “it is permissible to question suspects who invoked the right to counsel or
the right to remain silent.” Id. at 132. For example a training video instructed police
officers that:
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dissolved and an individual’s right to remain silent became
increasingly disrespected.179
Likewise, as noted by many commentators, the Court’s
decision in Hudson has created incentives for police to violate
knock-and-announce guidelines.180 It therefore appears vital
When you violate Miranda, you’re not violating the Constitution. Miranda is
not in the Constitution. It’s a court-created decision that affects the
admissibility of testimonial evidence and that’s all it is . . . [s]o you’re not
doing anything unlawful, you’re not doing anything illegal, you’re not
violating anybody’s civil rights, you’re doing nothing improper.
Id. at 110 (quoting Videotape: Questioning “Outside Miranda” (Greg Gulen
Productions 1990)).
179
Id. at 149. The Fifth Amendment states that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. This section of the Note will focus on the Fifth Amendment’s
self-incrimination clause which prohibits police from compelling a suspect to
incriminate him or herself.
180
See, e.g., Milton Hirsch, Hudson v. Michigan: Whose Fourth Amendment Is
It, Anyway?, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 50-51 (stating that, as a result of the
majority’s opinion, “if the police do come crashing through your front door without
giving the householder a fair chance, or any chance, to open the door, the exclusionary
rule doesn’t apply”). Hirsch argues that there is no remedy when police officers violate
the knock-and-announce rule because
[t]he conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter violation of
the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which excludes illegally
obtained evidence. Only by exclusion can we impress . . . that violation of the
Constitution will . . . do no . . . good. And only when that point is driven home
can the prosecutor be expected to emphasize the importance of observing
constitutional demands in his instructions to the police.
Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting)). Hirsch is
not alone in holding these sentiments. See Cathy Young, Editorial, Exclusionary Rule
Sends Dangerous Message, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 9, 2006, at D2 (arguing
that “leaving the exclusionary rule intact but exempting no-knock searches from its
scope sends a dangerous message that for police to burst into a citizen’s house
unannounced is no big deal.”); Elaine Silvestrini & Valerie Kalfrin, Ruling Unlikely to
Alter Police Searches, TAMPA TRIBUNE, June 16, 2006 at 1 (quoting defense attorney
John Fitzgibbons, “Police now [after Hudson] have a great deal of leeway and this
simply continues the trend in weakening the Fourth Amendment”); Stephanie Francis
Ward, Court Backs Evidence Found in “Knock-Announce” Case: Justices’ 5-4 Decision
Narrows Exclusionary Rule in Police Searches, ABA J. E-REP., June 16, 2006, at 1
(quoting Timothy Lynch, Director of the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice,
“Here was an opportunity for the court to put the brake on [paramilitary style raids],
and say, ‘slow things down,’ but they didn’t . . . . This is a kind of weakening of the
[exclusionary] rule, and our fear is that the brake which was needed has not been
applied.”); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 605 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
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that effective deterrence mechanisms be put in place before
police training changes in response to a significantly watered
down knock-and-announce rule. The institutionalization of
questioning outside Miranda serves as a warning that if
nothing is done, officers may be taught how to effectively get
around the knock-and-announce requirement.
A.

Potential Problems If Hudson Is Not Rectified:
A Comparison to Questioning Outside Miranda

In 1995, training materials from several California
police departments181 revealed the promotion of a “new vision of
Miranda” that encouraged officers to continue questioning
suspects even after they invoked their Fifth Amendment
rights.182 This technique was referred to as questioning “outside
Miranda” and was advocated by police officials who believed
that Court exceptions had transformed the original version of
the Miranda rule.183 For example, in Harris v. New York, the
Court held that statements obtained in violation of the
Miranda warnings could still be used at trial for impeachment
purposes, as long as trustworthiness was shown.184 As a result
of this exception, officers realized that even if they violated
Miranda, a suspect’s statements and other valuable evidence
could still be admissible at trial, just not in the prosecution’s
case-in-chief.185 Accordingly, exceptions like Harris led police to
disregard and circumvent the Miranda warnings by creating
new guidelines that would allow officers to question suspects
even after the suspects invoked their Miranda rights.186

dissenting) (“[The majority’s decision] destroys the strongest legal incentive to comply
with the Constitution’s knock-and-announce requirement.”); BALKO, supra note 10, at
34; Randy Balko, Hard Knocks With No-Knock: Why Is It Unreasonable to Announce
and Wait?, REASONONLINE: FREE MINDS AND FREE MARKETS, June 20, 2006,
http://www.reason.com/links/links062006.shtml.
181
In addition to those in California, police officers in Arizona, Colorado, the
District of Columbia and Missouri have all been found to question suspects “outside
Miranda.” Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane
Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 670 (2006) (“[E]xact numbers are not
available, but evidence suggests the practice has been spreading.”).
182
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 132.
183
Thompson, supra note 181, at 649.
184
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). For further exceptions see
infra note 199.
185
Evidence could not be used in the prosecution’s direct case, but could be
used for other purposes such as to impeach or cross-examine a witness. Weisselberg,
Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 134.
186
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 132.
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Professor Charles Weisselberg drew attention to this
new practice by publicizing training manuals that informed
officers that “the warning and waiver components of Miranda
were simply a court-created ‘series of recommended procedural
safeguards that were not themselves rights protected in the
Constitution.’”187 Moreover, officers received instructions that
as long as they “avoid overbearing tactics that offend the Fourteenth Amendment due process, the mere fact of deliberate
noncompliance with Miranda does not affect admissibility for
impeachment . . . officers risk no civil liability for ‘benign’
questioning outside Miranda. Instead, they have ‘little to lose
and perhaps something to gain.”188 Thus, this “new vision of
Miranda” taught officers that adherence to the Miranda
warnings was optional.189 Officers realized they had a choice.
They could abide by the Miranda rule and cease questioning
suspects once they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights, or
they could violate the rule and the prosecution would only
receive a minimal penalty of having the evidence excluded from
their case-in-chief.190 As officers began to do the latter, the
protections of the Fifth Amendment were significantly undermined and little respect was given to individual autonomy and
Supreme Court authority.191 As Weisselberg noted, “the Court
could not have intended to give police grounds to disobey this

187

Id. at 133 (quoting a California District Attorneys Association training
bulletin). Weisselberg’s article gives examples from training bulletins, manuals, and
videos that reflected California’s widespread practice of training officers to go outside
Miranda. See id. at 133-36.
188
Id. at 133-34.
189
Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1308-10 (2000).
190
Id.; see Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1133 (2001) [hereinafter Weisselberg, After Dickerson]. When being
trained outside Miranda, officers are taught “there is nothing legally or morally wrong
in interrogating a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent. Questioning over an invocation merely has an evidentiary consequence at trial.”
Id. at 1124-25. Additionally, even though the statement seized can not be used in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, officers are trained that “you can accomplish all of these
legitimate purposes that don’t have anything to do with the prosecution of the case,
and some that do, by talking to the guy ‘outside Miranda.’ ” Id. at 1125 (quoting
Videotape: Questioning: ‘Outside Miranda’ (Greg Gulen Productions 1990)). As
Weisselberg suggests, “Officers trained in this fashion perceive no downside to
questioning ‘outside Miranda.’ Investigators who respect an invocation . . . will obtain
no information from a suspect. On the other hand, questioning over an invocation may
yield useful information, even if that information has a limited use at trial.” Id.
191
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 168; Thompson, supra note
181, at 648 (discussing how “the police increasingly ignore Miranda”).
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portion of Miranda deliberately, but this disregard is the
natural consequence of these decisions.”192
Although the Court did not intend to create a
framework in which officers would be trained on how to
circumvent the Miranda warnings, through its decisions the
Court transformed the established rule. As a result of the
Court’s Miranda exceptions, the “unintended consequence . . .
[of] these restrictions sen[t] a clear message that many
constitutionally defective evidence-gathering acts will go
unpunished. Some police departments have internalized this
news as conferring a ‘green light’ to lawless action.”193 Likewise,
as the Court’s decision in Hudson has significantly weakened
the knock-and-announce rule, there is now the legitimate
possibility that officers will be trained in a new manner that
will allow them to circumvent knock-and-announce guidelines
completely. When the Court weakened the link of the Miranda
warnings to the Constitution, commentators noted that “by
alienating Miranda’s rule from the Fifth Amendment, the
Justices have undermined its legitimacy.”194 Accordingly, the
same holds true in the knock-and-announce context.

192

Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 132 (emphasis added).
Davies, supra note 189, at 1319. For some time, the Miranda warnings
were considered a non-constitutional rule of evidence. Weisselberg argues that the
Court’s opinion in United States v. Dickerson, which reaffirmed Miranda as a
constitutional rule, has resulted in a change of police policies and training as some
police departments in California are now being trained not to violate the Miranda rule
by questioning outside Miranda. Weisselberg, After Dickerson, supra note 190, at 1122.
But see Thompson, supra note 181, at 653. Thompson’s article seems to suggest that
going outside Miranda is still a technique used by law enforcement officials. Id. She
argues that Missouri v. Seibert and United States v. Patane, both decided in 2004 after
Dickerson, have resulted in police questioning outside Miranda. Id. (stating that this
just adds to the already “diminished . . . possibility that Miranda might play even a
moderately effective role in reducing the coercive atmosphere in the interrogation
room”). Seibert involved the practice of “questioning first.” See id. at 646. Under this
practice, an officer does not give the Miranda warnings until after a defendant
confesses, and then the officer attempts to obtain the confession a second time, which
would be admissible because it followed the warnings. See id. The officer in Seibert
admitted that he purposely withheld the Miranda warnings, and the Court
acknowledged the practice of police circumventing Miranda guidelines. Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 605-06 (2004). A divided Court held that the statements were
inadmissible, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence (which provides the holding of the
case) devised a two-part test which appears to do little to solve the problem. Id. at 61822; Thompson, supra note 181, at 672, 677-81. Additionally, in United States v. Patane,
the Court held that “the ‘physical fruit’ of a voluntary statement—in this case, a gun—
is admissible even if the statement is given without a sufficient Miranda warning[].”
Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2032 n.43 (2006) (citing United States v. Patane, 542
U.S. 630, 643 (2004)).
194
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 130. As Weisselberg notes:
193
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This Note argues that, just as officers saw a weakened
Miranda rule as the “go ahead” to circumvent the established
law, officers may now be influenced to evade the knock-andannounce rule since violations will not always result in the
suppression of evidence. Instructive similarities can be drawn
between the knock-and-announce rule and the Miranda
warnings. First, the knock-and-announce rule and the Miranda
rule are both common law principles that are not explicitly
written in the Constitution, but are directly linked to the
Constitution through the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
respectively.195 Because the Court has held that violations of
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment are subject to the
exclusionary rule, it is in the Court’s discretion to suppress the
evidence that is obtained in violation of the knock-andannounce rule and the Miranda rule at trial.196 Currently, only

Here, any wound to the Supreme Court’s authority from allowing the practice
of questioning “outside Miranda” is mostly self-inflicted. After all, the
Supreme Court itself has encouraged the practice by driving a wedge between
Miranda and the Fifth Amendment and by creating incentives to violate
Miranda. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s clear public rulings—that
questioning must cease upon a proper invocation—diverge so greatly from
actual police interrogation practices that, whatever the cause, this gap
threatens the integrity of the law and its institutions. Obviously aware of this
gap between the language in court opinions and police practice, authors of
“outside Miranda” training materials boldly tell officers that “the courts have
no authority to declare that non-compliance [with Miranda] is ‘unlawful,’ nor
to direct the manner in which police investigate crimes.”
Id. at 168-69 (alteration in original) (quoting Commission on Peace Officer Standards
& Training, Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Interrogation Law Instructors’ Outline, at 21 (1996)).
195
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 443 (1966); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 936 (1995) (establishing that the knock-and-announce rule is mandated by
the Constitution and part of the Fourth Amendment); Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,
supra note 15, at 110 (suggesting the link of the Miranda rules to the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35
(2000) (reaffirming that Miranda is and has always been a constitutional rule). For
some time, Miranda warnings were considered a “prophylactic,” non-constitutional
rule, which further supported the idea that officers could go outside Miranda and
continue to interrogate suspects after they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 128. However, in Dickerson, the Court
noted this concern and held that “Miranda is a constitutional decision.” 530 U.S. at
437.
196
The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 42, at 186-87 (“Under the exclusionary
rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments may not
be introduced at trial for the purpose of proving the defendant’s guilt.”). The Supreme
Court recognized in Boyd v. United States the similarities between the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, stating that they “run almost into each other.” 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886) (quoted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961). Boyd also noted, “The
principles laid down in this opinion . . . . apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employés of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”
Id.
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what commentators refer to as a “weak exclusionary rule”
is attached to Miranda.197 Second, in establishing the necessity
of both the knock-and-announce requirement and the Miranda
warnings, the Court set forth limitations on the implementation of these rules.198 Over time, the Court has expanded these
limitations and continued to carve out exceptions to both rules,
which has weakened their application and created incentives
for police to violate their guidelines.199
197
Weisselberg, After Dickerson, supra note 190, at 113 (arguing that a
weaker exclusionary rule is applied to Miranda violations than to Fourth Amendment
violations and “other types of compelled testimony and . . . statements that violate the
Fourteenth Amendment”); see Thompson, supra note 181, at 648 (suggesting that the
Court does not strictly apply the exclusionary rule to Miranda violations).
198
In Wilson, the Court determined that certain circumstances would
reasonably justify a police officer’s unannounced entry, and left the lower courts to
decide when those conditions were present. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936. Likewise, the
Court did not apply the Miranda rules to all interrogations without counsel, just those
that took place while a suspect was in custody. Moreover, the Miranda Court permitted
states to implement their own or additional procedures as long as they would protect
an individual’s right against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
199
In regard to the Miranda rules, the Court’s first exception was made in
Harris v. New York, in which the Court held that “prosecutors can use for
impeachment purposes a statement from a suspect in custody who did not receive
Miranda warnings so long as ‘the trustworthiness of evidence satisfies legal
standards’ . . . .” Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 15, at 127. This allows
officers to use statements that were obtained without proper Miranda warnings to
prove a defendant’s guilt for all purposes, except the government’s case-in-chief. For
example, the statement can be used against a defendant for impeachment or crossexamination purposes. Id. Additionally, the Court held in Michigan v. Tucker “that
Miranda’s exclusionary rule does not apply to the ‘fruits,’ evidence derived from
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.” Thompson, supra note 181, at 648. This
allows the fruits of statements to be admissible where questioning preceded Miranda,
but trial followed. Moreover, in New York v. Quarles, the Court created a “public safety
exception” under which “warnings are not necessary when officers ask a suspect
questions arising from a reasonable concern for public safety.” Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, supra note 15, at 129. The Court asserted that a cost-benefit analysis should
be applied here, and if the circumstances are such that the need for answers in order to
protect public safety outweighs the protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the
failure to give warnings is justified. Id. These three exceptions led police to train
outside Miranda, which is important for the purposes of this Note. However, other
exceptions were established which further weakened the Miranda rule, such as that in
United States v. Patane, which “broadens the long-standing rule that physical evidence
derived from Miranda violations is freely admissible even as part of the government’s
case in chief, clarifying that even intentional violations may yield admissible fruits.”
Thompson, supra note 181, at 648. In Patane, the Court held that “the ‘physical fruit’ of
a voluntary statement—in this case, a gun—is admissible even if the statement is
given without a sufficient Miranda warnings.” Klein, supra note 193, at 2032 n.43
(citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (2004)).
The Supreme Court has also created exceptions to the knock-and-announce
rule that have weakened its application and use. See supra Part II.A. In Richards v.
Wisconsin, the Court held that officers are not required to knock and announce when
exigent circumstances are present. Thus, where police have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing would be “dangerous or futile,” or would “inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence,” a no-
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As a result of the Court’s decision not to apply the
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations, the Court
effectively took away the only major legal incentive that police
had to abide by its procedures.200 Officers are now aware that
whether or not they obey the law and follow the knockand-announce requirement, the evidence seized will still be
admissible at trial. Thus, the need for a legal incentive to deter
police misconduct and guarantee compliance with the law is
imperative. In order to ensure that officers abide by the Fourth
Amendment guarantees and protections, the exclusionary rule
must be applied to knock-and-announce violations.
B.

The Only Plausible Solution: The Exclusionary Rule
as an Effective Remedy

It is necessary for the Court to apply the exclusionary
rule to knock-and-announce violations in order to ensure that
an effective deterrence mechanism is in place.201 Although the
Court in Hudson determined that the costs of applying the
exclusionary rule outweigh the benefits,202 the increased militarization of the police force and the very real possibility that

knock entry is lawful. 529 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). Additionally, in United States v. Banks,
the Court determined that when police believe that destruction of the evidence is
possible, fifteen seconds is a reasonable amount of time before entering an individual’s
home. 540 U.S. 31, 40 (2003). Although this may seem like a long time, for individuals
who are sleeping or on the couch in another room, this may not present them with
enough time to get to the door before police forcibly enter. See BALKO, supra note 10, at
32. Lastly, the Court’s decision in Hudson appears to be the most significant decision
concerning the knock-and-announce rule, as it established that evidence that is seized
in violation of the knock-and-announce rule can be used at trial to determine a
defendant’s guilt. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). Additionally, in
Hudson the police only waited three to five seconds before entering Hudson’s home and
although Hudson appealed his conviction based on this premature entry, the Court
determined that suppression was not required. Id. at 2162. This seems to suggest that
in future cases where police only wait three to five seconds before entering, no
penalties will be applied.
200
Before the Court’s decision in Hudson, courts did apply the exclusionary
rule to knock-and-announce violations. For example, in United States v. Dice, the Sixth
Circuit stated that the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for knock-andannounce violations. In coming to this conclusion, the court determined that “[t]o
remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce violation whenever
officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift move gut the constitution’s
regulation of how officers execute such warrants.” United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978,
986 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Eighth Circuit opinion in United
States v. Marts also applied the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations
when officers did not wait a reasonable amount of time before entering. 986 F.2d 1216,
1220 (8th Cir. 1993).
201
See infra notes 212-221 and accompanying text.
202
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594-95.
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police training could change as a result of weakened knockand-announce guidelines make clear that the costs of not
applying the exclusionary rule are indeed significant. Thus, the
Court must act to rectify its decision in Hudson and reinstate
the authority of the knock-and-announce rule.203
1. Other Deterrence Mechanisms Do Not Deter
As the need to preserve individuals’ Fourth Amendment
rights and promote lawful police activity is imperative, a
forceful deterrent must be put in place. The only effective
way to create such a deterrent is through the legal threat of
the exclusionary rule. In Hudson, the majority relied on
implausible and ineffective deterrence mechanisms, leaving
officers little incentive to comply with knock-and-announce
procedures.204 Specifically, the majority determined that the
increased professionalism of law enforcement officials and the
threat of civil suits will prevent officers from violating the
knock-and-announce rule.205 Although these safeguards may be
available in theory as the Court suggests, in reality they do not
serve to deter police misconduct and unlawful behavior.
First, as already explained, the rise of paramilitary
units within local police departments has resulted in a
militaristic style of law enforcement and detrimental behavior
that debunks the Court’s notion that police departments
have become increasingly professionalized.206 Second, evidence
suggests that a civil suit against a police officer is not a viable
remedy when an individual’s rights are violated by an officer’s
failure to knock and announce.207 Not only do the obstacles
faced by one who seeks to bring a suit against a police officer
make it unlikely that a victim of police misconduct will succeed
203
Although stated in regards to Miranda, this statement proves worthwhile
here: “If supervisors wish to imbue respect for Miranda [in this case the knock-andannounce rule], they must themselves take [it] seriously and signal that they prefer
their officers to honor an invocation, even when doing so means losing an opportunity
to gain useful information or evidence.” Weisselberg, After Dickerson, supra note 190,
at 1156.
204
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 605 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205
Id. at 595, 598-99 (majority opinion). See supra text accompanying notes
92-95.
206
See supra Part IV.
207
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 611-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This too has
proven to be an ineffective remedy to ensure that officers follow knock-and-announce
guidelines because there are many obstacles that a lawyer and his client will encounter
when bringing a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against law enforcement
officials.
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in court,208 but even in the rare case that a civil suit survives
summary judgment, it is very unlikely that substantial
monetary sanctions will be granted.209 With only these weak
208
See generally Criminal Practice Guide, supra note 123 (discussing how
lawyers should proceed in criminal cases as a result of the Court’s decision in Hudson).
First, most citizens lack the knowledge that civil rights suits are available and,
moreover, they do not have the necessary resources to initiate such a suit. Id. Even if
an individual has the means to initiate a suit, consider a lawyer’s argument when
asking the jury to find in favor of his or her client. See Hirsch, supra note 180. Hirsch
offers the following hypothetical opening statement to illustrate the difficulties a
lawyer would face when his or her guilty client seeks to bring a civil rights suit for a
knock-and announce-violation:

In this case, the police obtained a warrant to search my client’s home for
drugs. They searched . . . found the drugs . . . my client was convicted for
possession of those drugs . . . which is why he appears before us in court
today in handcuffs, leg manacles . . . . Pay no attention to those things. The
fact is that the police, in executing their search warrant, smashed my client’s
door down. Those door hinges were completely destroyed! They were really
expensive hinges . . . . [s]o we’re going to ask for one million dollars in
damages, to teach those police officer to respect [] constitutional rights . . . .
Id. As this example suggests, lawyers will have a difficult time convincing a jury to find
in favor of their otherwise guilty client. The qualified immunity defense is another
hurdle that must be overcome to succeed in a civil rights claim against law
enforcement officials for violating the knock-and-announce rule. See supra note 123
(explaining the qualified immunity defense). In knock-and-announce suits, a court will
often find in favor of an officer on the qualified immunity defense, concluding that the
officer had a reasonable belief that a forced entry was necessary to protect him- or
herself against harm. Urbonya, supra note 123, at 104; see, e.g., Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400
F.3d 1070, 1080-83 (7th Cir. 2006) (granting qualified immunity to an officer after he
did not knock and announce and used guns and tactical lights to gain entry into
plaintiff’s apartment). Moreover, courts have found that when the question is a close
one, “the officers are entitled to the benefit of doubt under the qualified immunity
standard.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dickerson v.
McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1996).
209
See Brief for Petitioner at *37, Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 (No. 04-1360)
(alleging that there are no cases cited in the opposition briefs that show the award of
tangible damages as a result of knock-and-announce violations); see, e.g., Doran v.
Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 960-72 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing a jury award of over $2 million
for an officer’s illegal no-knock entry into the defendant’s home, holding that the entry
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). In an effort to emphasize this point, it
is helpful to examine Michigan’s state law prior to Hudson. In 1999, the Michigan
Supreme Court held, in People v. Stevens, that the exclusionary rule is not a valid
remedy for knock-and-announce violations. 597 N.W.2d 53, 64 (1999). Rather,
Michigan relied on federal and state incentives that prohibit police misconduct and
allow individuals to bring private claims against officers if a civil rights violation
occurs. Id. As Hudson was being argued, Michigan’s law was examined to determine if
damages were in fact granted for knock-and-announce violations. Hudson, 547 U.S. at
610 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Not only did a brief in support of the petitioner assert that
it could not find any decisions that awarded actual damages in knock-and-announce
violations, but the respondent’s lawyer, Mr. Timothy Baughman, conceded this point
during oral argument before the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioner at *59,
Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 (No. 04-1360); Transcript of Oral Argument, Jan. 9, 2006, at *3132, Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 (No. 04-1360) [hereinafter Hudson Transcript]. Accordingly,
Mr. Baughman stated that he was not aware of any successful § 1983 actions in
Michigan since the Stevens decision, which took place five years prior. Hudson
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deterrence mechanisms in effect, officers know that whether or
not they follow knock-and-announce procedures the likelihood
of sanction is slight and the evidence seized will still be
admissible at trial.
2. Why the Exclusionary Rule? Because It Actually
Deters
It is crucial that the Court reconsider Hudson and put
deterrence mechanisms into effect that will actually prevent
unlawful police behavior. In holding that evidence should not
be subject to suppression and, subsequently, not condemning
officers for forcibly breaking into Hudson’s home after only a
three-to-five second waiting period, the Hudson majority sent
the message that knocking-and-announcing is just a futile
gesture that does not need to be respected.210 Thus, as this Note
argues, only through the legal sanction of the exclusionary rule
Transcript, supra, at *31-32. Subsequently, in oral arguments before the Supreme
Court in May 2006, Mr. Baughman restated that he was still not aware of any
Michigan case where a civil judgment was rendered against law enforcement officials
for knock-and-announce violations. Id. at *36-38. Additionally, an extensive search of
case law revealed only one unpublished decision where monetary damages were
actually awarded. See Buss v. Quigg, No. 01-CV-3908, 20002 LEXIS 19324 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 9, 2002). In Buss, it appears that the plaintiff collected nominal damages of $1
after officers failed to knock and announce. Thus, even in the limited cases in which
damages are in fact rewarded, they seem to be nominal. This finding is supported by
Justice Breyer in his dissent, condemning the majority’s reliance on civil suits: “The
majority . . . has failed to cite a single reported case in which a plaintiff has collected
more than nominal damages solely as a result of a knock-and-announce violation.”
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer continues, “[T]he majority, as
it candidly admits, has simply ‘assumed’ that ‘[a]s far as [it] know[s], civil liability is an
effective deterrent,’ a support-free assumption that Mapp and subsequent cases make
clear does not embody the Court’s normal approach to difficult questions of Fourth
Amendment law.” Id. at 611 (citation omitted).
210
The decision seems to suggest that in future cases where police only wait
three to five seconds before entering an individual’s home, no penalties will be applied.
Accordingly, the whole purpose of the knock-and-announce rule appears to be undercut
as the Court has stated that two of the main purposes of the knock-and-announce rule
are
the protection of human life and limb, because an unannounced entry may
provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident. . . . [and
the protection of] those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed
by a sudden entrance. It gives residents the “opportunity to prepare
themselves for” the entry of the police. “The brief interlude between
announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an
individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.”
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (citations omitted) (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.
385, 393 n.5 (1997)). Surely, three to five seconds is not a sufficient amount of time to
guarantee that an individual receives the protections afforded by the knock-andannounce rule.
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will officers be compelled to abide by knock-and-announce
procedures for fear that vital evidence will be suppressed at
trial.211
In determining the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule, some research suggests that a majority of officers believe
the exclusionary rule deters misconduct, and many are
convinced that the threat of suppression results in better law
enforcement. For example, a study conducted of Chicago’s
judges, police officers, public defenders, and prosecutors by
Professor Myron W. Orfield supports the idea that the
exclusionary rule does deter police misconduct.212 First, Orfield
studied the impact of suppression on the rate of conviction and
concluded that the exclusionary rule does not often affect the
prosecution of crimes because in most cases where evidence
was suppressed, a defendant was still convicted based on
alternative forms of evidence.213 Accordingly, the majority’s fear
in Hudson that suppression of the evidence is a “get-out-of-jailfree card” is not as accurate as the Court suggests.214 Second,
Orfield’s research of police department members established
that they view the exclusionary rule as an advantageous
institutional deterrent,215 which they believe “does little harm
to police work, and instead makes them more professional.”216
211

See infra notes 212-221 and accompanying text.
See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992). For
additional studies on the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule, see H. Mitchell
Caldwell, Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: Can One Trial Judge in One County in One
State Nudge a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, BYU L. REV. 2006, at 1 (discussing
different studies on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule); see also William C.
Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule:
The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311 (1991);
L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A
New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for Civil
Administrative Remedy to Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669 (1998).
213
Orfield, supra note 212, at 78. Over the course of his research, Orfield
determined that “[i]n Chicago, a jurisdiction with a comparatively high rate of
suppression, unconstitutionally obtained evidence is suppressed under the exclusionary
rule in only 0.9% of armed robbery cases, 0.5% of residential burglary cases, and 0.5%
of cases involving violent crimes. Moreover, in many of the cases where evidence was
suppressed, convictions were still obtained on the basis of other evidence.” Id.
214
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595-96 (discussing the costs of applying the
exclusionary rule).
215
Ninety-eight percent of Orfield’s respondents believed that the exclusionary rule effectively deterred police misconduct. Orfield, supra note 212, at 77, 8485.
216
Id. at 81. Orfield’s research for his “Police Study” was gathered when
he was a law student at the University of Chicago. Orfield “interviewed twenty-six
of approximately one hundred officers in the Narcotics Section of the Organized
Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department . . . using a 26-page standardized
212
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Accordingly, Orfield determined that application of the exclusionary rule actually promotes professionalism and internal
discipline—the very things that the Hudson majority believed
made the exclusionary rule unnecessary.217 His study showed
that police and prosecutors design programs and create
incentives to avoid the risk of suppression of evidence, which
results in better compliance with the Fourth Amendment.218
Likewise, Orfield noted a similar positive reaction to the
exclusionary rule in his study of judges, assistant public
defenders, and assistant state attorneys.219 Orfield’s interviewees suggested that because “officers care about convictions
and experience adverse personal reactions when they lose
evidence . . .[,] police change their behavior in response to
suppression of the evidence.”220 The impact of suppression on
the police force in terms of professionalism and conduct led
court respondents to proclaim, “that there is no more effective a
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations . . . [and] they believe
the rule should be retained.”221 Therefore, it is only through the
threat of suppression that officers will curb their unlawful
behavior and comply with the established law. As studies show
questionnaire with multiple choice and open-ended questions centering on deterrence.”
Id. at 79-80.
217
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. In support of this view, Orfield
stated that the “[c]ourt respondents, like the police respondents, believe that the
exclusionary rule, although imperfect . . . clearly leads to increased police
professionalism and greater observance of the law of the Fourth Amendment.” Orfield,
supra note 212, at 83 (emphasis added).
218
Orfield, supra note 212, at 80. “These efforts include increased and
improved Fourth Amendment training, internal review of lost cases, better
administrative record-keeping to track the number of suppression cases, increased use
of search warrants, and a system to ‘register’ the anonymous informants who provide
information to police.” Id.
219
Id. at 83. Orfield’s method of obtaining information for his “Court Study”
was similar to his police study. Orfield used “a structured questionnaire, this time
twenty pages long, with multiple choice and open-ended questions centering on
deterrence.” Id. at 81. Additionally, “of the 41 felony trial courtrooms in the Criminal
Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, [Orfield] randomly selected a sample of
14. For each of these courtrooms, he attempted to interview the judge, a randomly
selected assistant public defender, and an assistant state’s attorney assigned to the
courtroom.” Ultimately, “[i]n place of the [three] state’s attorneys who declined to
participate, [he] substituted other persons assigned to the same courtroom. [He] could
not substitute for the one non-participant judge. Each interview took one and a half to
two hours.” Id. at 81-82.
220
Id. Court and police respondents agreed that the exclusionary rule is
effective because it educates officers about what is and what is not acceptable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 91.
221
Id. Furthermore, the court respondents “do not believe the rule causes
significant harm to police work. Although . . . the rule can sometimes be unjust to
crime victims, they believe the rule’s benefits to society equal or exceed the costs.” Id.
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that the exclusionary rule prevents police misconduct and
promotes the increased professionalism of law enforcement
officials, it appears to be the only effective remedy to deter
knock-and-announce violations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The knock-and-announce rule has withstood the test of
time, with its common law roots dating back to thirteenth
century England.222 In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court recognized
the rule’s resilience and importance by holding that it is a
constitutional command necessary to safeguard an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights.223 Despite its ultimate holding in
Hudson v. Michigan, the Court reaffirmed the main purposes
of the knock-and-announce rule: “the protection of human
life and limb” and the protection of “those elements of privacy
and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.”224
Accordingly, the security that the knock-and-announce rule
affords cannot be overstated.
The Court’s decision in Hudson substantially weakens
the knock-and-announce requirement by inviting the police to
disobey it:
As repeated players, police have an incentive to comply with what the
established laws allow them to do, rather than what the law explicitly
instructs them to do. Through repeated interaction with the courts
(and police disciplinary boards), police officers learn of—and respond
to—judicially created incentives.225

By mitigating the threat that potential evidence may be
suppressed at trial, the Court has undermined the main legal
incentive for officers to actually knock and announce.226 As the
police response to weakened Miranda jurisprudence illustrates,
when an original rule is severely undercut by exceptions,
officers discover ways to get around the law.227 After Hudson,
officers know that whether or not they abide by the knock-andannounce rule, evidence gathered will still be admissible at
222

Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
224
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
225
Case Comment, supra note 174, at 714-15 (emphasis added).
226
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 605, 610-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As
paramilitary raids result in violence and injury, the Court’s decision in Hudson leaves
the door open for an increase in this behavior.
227
See supra Part V.1.A.
223
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trial. It is not enough for the Court to state that the knockand-announce rule is still in effect.228 To prevent unlawful
police behavior, it is crucial that the Court re-establish the
importance of the knock-and-announce requirement. The only
effective way to do so is through legal sanction, and experience
has shown that the only effective legal sanction against police
misconduct of this sort is that provided by the exclusionary
rule.
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Hudson, 547 U.S. at 602-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy states “The Court’s decision should not be interpreted as suggesting
that violations of the requirement are trivial or beyond the law’s concern.” Id.
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